The Attorney-Client Relationship: A Jewish Law Perspective by Resnicoff, Steven H.
Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy
Volume 14
Issue 1 Symposium on Ethics Article 12
February 2014
The Attorney-Client Relationship: A Jewish Law
Perspective
Steven H. Resnicoff
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy at NDLScholarship. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Notre Dame Journal of Law, Ethics & Public Policy by an authorized administrator of NDLScholarship. For more information,
please contact lawdr@nd.edu.
Recommended Citation
Steven H. Resnicoff, The Attorney-Client Relationship: A Jewish Law Perspective, 14 Notre Dame J.L. Ethics & Pub. Pol'y 349 (2000).
Available at: http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/ndjlepp/vol14/iss1/12
THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIP:
A JEWISH LAW PERSPECTIVE
STEVEN H. RESNICOFF*
Professors Thomas L. Shaffer and Robert F. Cochran, Jr.,
describe four models for approaching moral choices in the attor-
ney-client context.1 These paradigms portray the practitioner as
(1) godfather, (2) hired gun, (3) guru, or (4) friend. They prin-
cipally differ as to the extent to which the attorney, rather than
the client, controls the relationship and the degree to which the
interests of persons other than the client are considered
important.2
As godfather, the lawyer perceives the client's narrowly
defined interests as paramount and does "whatever it takes," irre-
spective of the impact on others, to promote such interests. The
godfather attorney pursues this path without even consulting the
client concerning ethical qualms. The hired gun approach simi-
larly accepts the client's interests as the sole barometer of suc-
cess. It differs only in that the client purportedly makes the
moral choices, and the attorney "merely" follows orders.' By con-
trast, an attorney guru considers the consequences to third par-
ties and, based on some set of ethical criteria, determines-
essentially without input from his client-what his client's mor-
* Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law. B.A., Princeton
University, 1974; J.D., Yale Law School, 1978; Rabbinic Degree, Beth Medrash
Govoha, 1983; Chair (1998-99), Section onJewish Law, Association of American
Law Schools. I express my gratitude to the DePaul University College of Law
for the 1999 summer research grant that enabled me to write this and other
articles aboutJewish law. I am grateful for the kind support I have consistently
received from Dean Teree Foster. I also appreciate the helpful comments Pro-
fessor Rodney Blackman made on an earlier draft. I especially thank my dear
friend, Rabbi Aaron Small, with whom I studied a number of relevant texts, for
his perceptive insights and suggestions. Much of Parts IA and IB of this article
were written for my chapter, Helping A Client Violate Jewish Law, in JEWIsH LAW
ASSOCIATION STUDIES (Hannah Sprecher ed., forthcoming 2000).
1. See THoMAs L. SHAFFER & ROBERT F. COCHRAN, JR., LAwvRs, CLIEN'rS,
AND MORAL RESPONSIBILrTY (1994).
2. See id. at 3-4.
3. The attorney, of course, as an independent moral agent, is fully
responsible for the moral choice she makes in implementing each of the cli-
ent's orders. The "hired gun" model simply describes a relationship in which
the attorney erroneously fails to perceive herself as responsible for such
decisions.
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ally correct conduct should be and proceeds accordingly. The
attorney who acts as friend, however, not only considers what
might be ethically correct but engages his client in moral dis-
course, the purpose of which is to enable his client to make the
right decision for the right reasons. The attorney friend, how-
ever, does not attempt to manipulate his client to do the right
thing.4
Jewish law (Halakha) assumes the existence of an omnipo-
tent, omniscient and benevolent Creator and the existence of a
network of relationships-pursuant to His decree-between and
among the Creator and all human beings. The purpose of this
article is to examine how, in light of these assumptions and appli-
cable Jewish law doctrines, none of the Shaffer-Cochran models
adequately captures Jewish law's view of the relationship a Jewish
attorney has with his client, particularly when the client also hap-
pens to be Jewish.
I. THE GODFATHER AND HIRED GUN APPROACHES
The godfather and hired gun models may be based on the
belief that the adversary system requires an attorney to act as
though his client's narrowly defined interests are of almost exclu-
sive importance. Consequently, other societal values-of the
community as a whole and of other individuals-are sacrificed to
advance the client's legal interests. For example, to further the
client's interests, the attorney is often not required-and some-
times not even allowed-to make certain disclosures that could
powerfully promote the quest for truth and justice in a given
case, that could protect innocent persons from harm (whether
emotional, financial or physical) or wrongful criminal convic-
tion, or that could safeguard the public from a client's propensity
for future criminality.5 Godfather and hired gun attorneys may
similarly justify their use of morally questionable tactics, such as
4. See SHAFFER & COCHRAN, supra note 1, at 50-51.
5. Although the American Bar Association has proposed Model Rules of
Professional Conduct ("ABA Rules"), each jurisdiction must adopt its own rules.
While an examination of all of the various approaches to confidentiality would
exceed the scope of this paper, a few observations are apt. Under ABA Rule
1.6, for instance, an attorney would not be required to voluntarily disclose any
information relating to the representation of a client (whether the information
came from the client or not) even if disclosure were necessary to prevent the
client from murdering someone. While states have generally rejected this
extreme approach, they, too, impose various important restrictions on an attor-
ney's duty and right to disclose information. Moreover, while an attorney is
typically directed to represent his client zealously, he is not instructed to give
any consideration to the independent interests of others. Comment 1 to ABA
Rule 1.3 states: "A lawyer should act with commitment and dedication to the
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sullying the reputations of honest people,6 on the adversary
system.
Where the means they employ are unobjectionable, perhaps
godfather or hired gun attorneys believe that they bear no
responsibility for the evil results to which their efforts contribute.
Such an attorney, for instance, may rely on the rationalization
that it is the client, not the attorney, that actually utilizes the
judgment to do wrong-such as by wrongfully collecting money
or avoiding some responsibility.
Jewish law, however, is not based on an adversarial litigative
system.7 It does not allow for a division between an attorney's
"personal" and "professional" activities.' Nor does Jewish law
permit a person to voluntarily undertake "fiduciary" obligations
to a client which would alter his preexisting duties of loyalty to
Jewish law. Consequently, a Jewish lawyer must eschew tactics
which, although technically permitted by secular law, violate
Halakha. The lawyer's status as an attorney provides no special
excuse for unscrupulous conduct.
Similarly, where a client's objective violates Jewish law, there
are at least four reasons why a Jewish attorney could not serve as
the client's godfather or hired gun: (1) it is biblically forbidden
to enable someone to violate Jewish law; (2) it may be rabbinically
prohibited to assist or to encourage someone to violate Jewish
law; (3) in at least some cases, there is an affirmative obligation
to try to prevent someone from violating Jewish law; and (4) in
many instances, there may also be a duty to protect someone-
interests of the client and with zeal in advocacy upon the client's behalf."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUcr Rule 1.3 cmt. 1 (1983).
The next two sentences of comment 1 are enigmatic: "However, a lawyer is
not bound to press for every advantage that might be realized for a client. A
lawyer has professional discretion in determining the means by which a matter
should be pursued." Id. Two observations are in order. First, these sentences
do not direct the lawyer to consider the interests of others but, at most, suggest
that the lawyer may do so. Second, the sentences do not seem to imply that an
attorney should, as a general rule, consider the substantive interests of others
but, instead, seem arguably to focus on the possible avoidance of what might be
perceived as "unfair," although permitted, procedures.
Of course, legislatures, motivated by substantive concerns, sometimes
require professionals to make particular disclosures. Nevertheless, such statutes
rarely apply to attorneys. See, e.g., Robert P. Mosteller, Child Abuse Reporting
Laws and Attorney-Client Confidences: The Reality and Specter of Lawyer as Informant,
42 DuKE L.J. 203 (1992).
6. See, e.g., Debra Baker, Shredding the Truth, A.B.A.J., Oct. 1999, at 40-44.
7. See Dov Frimer, The Role of a Lawyer in Jewish Law, 1 J.L. & RELIGION 297
(1983).
8. See, e.g., Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating
Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 TEX. TECH L. REv. 911 (1996).
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including your client's adversary-from being wrongfully
harmed, even if the harm is only financial.
A. The Ban Against Enabling Someone to Sin
The Torah commands that, "in front of the blind (lifnei iver),
do not place a stumbling block."9 Among other things,' the
lifnei iver doctrine proscribes enabling people to violate Jewish
law. This aspect of lifnei iver, not to frustrate the Divine Will, rep-
resents an obligation directly owed to God and applies whether
the person assisted is a Jew or a non-Jew. "
A classic discussion of this aspect of lifnei iver appears in the
Talmudic tractate Avodah Zarah. The first Mishnah in Avodah
Zarah states, in part, that it is impermissible to do business with
idolaters for three days preceding their religious holidays. The
Talmud asks if the reason for this prohibition is lest an idolater
profit from such transactions. Rabbi Shlomo Yitzhaki (Rashi)12
explains that if the idolater realizes a profit, he may-during the
impending religious holiday-praise his idol for the profit. By
causing this to happen, the Jew would thereby violate a specific
rule against causing the name of an idol to be mentioned."
Alternatively, the Talmud asks whether the prohibition is lest an
idolater use an item so purchased to worship his idol, because,
underJewish law, idol worship is forbidden to both Jews and non-
Jews. By providing the merchandise used in the non-Jew's idola-
try, the Jewish vender might be liable for lifnei iver.
The Talmud suggests there could be a practical difference
between these two reasons in a case in which a Jew wants to sell
an animal to an idolater. If the prohibition is based on the possi-
9. LEv. 19:14. See also R. YOSEF CARt, SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 151:1
(16th cent.) (Hebrew). Throughout the years, the views of scores of outstand-
ing commentators were annotated to the Shulhan Arukh, which has contributed
to its status as the most central code of Jewish law.
10. There are several aspects to the lifnei iver doctrine. See generally R.
YITZHAK ADLER, LIFNEI IVER (1988) (Hebrew). Surprisingly, there is a debate
amongJewish law authorities as to whether this prohibition applies to the literal
case in which one places a physical obstacle in front of a person who is visually
impaired. See id. at 15-18 (citing various views); R. MOSHE FEINSTEIN, IGGEROT
MOSHE, Yoreh De'ah 1:3 (20th cent.) (Hebrew) (stating that it applies to such a
case).
11. See FEINSTEIN, supra note 10, at Orah HayyimV:13(9) (causing another
to sin is not prohibited because it is a wrong against the sinner but because it is
a wrong against the Almighty).
12. R. SHLOMO YITZHAM, BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Avodah Zarah 6a (11th
cent.) (Hebrew) [hereinafter RASHI, TALMUD].
13. See id., (citing Exod. 23:13). This prohibition, which differs from the
rule against idolatry, is cited at CARO, supra note 9, at Orah Hayyim 156:1.
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bility of profit, the sale should be proscribed. If, on the other
hand, the prohibition is based on lifnei iver, the Talmud suggests
that the sale should be permitted, because, presumably, the idol-
ater already owns an animal he could use for a sacrifice. Thus, at
this point in the discussion, the Talmud assumes that one violates
the lifnei iver prohibition only if one provides help that is abso-
lutely necessary for the commission of a sin. The Talmud queries
whether this assumption is true:
If the idolater has his own animal [that he could use as
a sacrifice], does this really mean that [if ajew sells him an
animal and the idolater sacrifices that animal instead of
the one he already owns] there is no violation of lifnei ivel?
Was the following not taught in a braitha [a pre-Talmudic
text that, although not included in the Mishnah, is none-
theless authoritative]:
Rabbi Natan says: "How do we know that one may not
give a cup of wine to a Nazir [a Jew who has accepted
upon himself certain specific strictures, including a
duty to refrain from drinking wine] or a limb taken
from a live animal [which, under Jewish law, may not
be eaten by Jews or non-Jews] to a non-Jew?" It is
taught "[a]nd before a blind man, do not place a
stumbling block."
Yet if one does not hand it to him, he [the Nazir or the
non-Jew] will take it himselfl 4
Thus, the braitha taken at face value implies that helping a wrong-
doer commit a wrong violates lifnei iver even if the wrong could
have been committed without the help. The Talmud, however,
answers by restricting the rule of the braitha to a particular scena-
rio. The Talmud states that, in the braitha, Rabbi Natan was dis-
cussing cases in which the Nazir and the wine-and the limb
from a live animal and the non-Jew-were, respectively, "on two
[different] sides of the river," such that, without assistance,
neither the Nazir nor the non-Jew would have been able to
acquire the forbidden substances. Consequently, providing the
wine to the Nazir-and the animal limb to the non-Jew-did not
merely facilitate the sin but made it possible. If the prohibited
act could have been done without anyone's assistance, the Nazir
and the wine-and the non-Jew and the animal limb-would
have been described as being on "one side of the river." In such
a case, providing help does not violate any biblical lifnei iver rule.
There are various ways in which a client's objectives may vio-
late Jewish law. For example, a client may wish to collect money
14. TALMUD, at Avodah Zarah 6a-b.
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to which he is not entitled under Jewish law. In most monetary
disputes among Gentiles, there will usually be little, if any, con-
flict between secular law and Halakha. Where one or both par-
ties are Jewish, however, the parties' rights under secular and
Jewish law may significantly differ.15 If the client cannot success-
fully collect the "forbidden" money he seeks without the help of
a particular Jewish lawyer, the client and the money are "on two
sides of the river." If the lawyer represents the client and enables
him to obtain the money, all, or virtually all, authorities would
presumably rule that the attorney is guilty of lifnei ive. 16
But what if the client could have violated Jewish law and col-
lected the money without the help of a particular Jewish attor-
ney? Would the client and money be considered to be "on one
side of the river," thereby rendering lifnei iver inapplicable? The
answer depends on a variety of factors. For example, assume that
although the client does not need the help of a particular Jewish
lawyer, he does need the help of some Jewish lawyer. Based on
the personal chemistry that is essential to an attorney-client rela-
tionship, many Jews living in Israel, for instance, might simply
decide not to pursue a particular claim rather than use a non-
Jewish attorney, particularly if there are few local non-Jewish
attorneys to choose from. Although there is a notable minority
opinion, 17 mostJewish law authorities seem to follow the view of
15. Although several Jewish law doctrines, such as dina demalkhuta dina
(the law of the land is binding law) and minhag hasoharim (the custom of
merchants) integrate many secular laws and practices into the Jewish law sys-
tem, each of these principles is subject to various limitations. See generally
Michael J. Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, Jewish Law and Modern Business Struc-
tures: The Corporate Paradigm, 43 WAYNE L.REv. 1685, 1765-73 (1997); MichaelJ.
Broyde & Steven H. Resnicoff, The Corporate Veil and Halakhah: A Still Shrouded
Concept, in JEWISH BUSINESS ETHICS (Aaron Levine & Moses Pava eds., 1999);
Steven H. Resnicoff, Bankruptcy-A Viable Halachic Option?, 24 J. HALAcHA &
CONTEMP. Soc'Y 5 (1992); R. Tzvi Sendler, Liability for Motor Vehicle Damages, 36
J. HAtAcHA & CONTEMP. Soc'Y 58, 73 (1993) (arguing that neither doctrine
alters the basic Jewish law as to tort liability for motor vehicle damages).
16. See generally ADLER, supra note 10.
17. See, e.g., R. HAYYIM ELAZAR SHAPIRA, MINHAT ELAZAR 1:53 (20th cent.)
(Hebrew); R. AvRAHAM S. B. SOFER, KETAV SOFER, Yoreh De'ah 183 (19th cent.)
(Hebrew); R. ELIEZER WALDENBERG, TzITz ELIEZER XIX:32 (20th cent.)
(Hebrew) (asserting that this is actually the majority view). See also R. OVADIA
YOSEF, 3 YEHAVEH DA'AT 67 (20th cent.) (Hebrew) (citing various views). FEIN-
STrEIN, supra note 10, at Orah Hayyim IV:71, permits a teacher to prepare a child
to perform in the synagogue on the Sabbath, despite the strong likelihood that
the child will desecrate the Sabbath by traveling to the synagogue in a motor
vehicle. Feinstein notes that if the teacher refuses to instruct the child, some-
one else would do so. For this reason, Feinstein states that only the rabbinic
mesayeah rule, see infta pt.I(B), and not the biblical lifnei iver prohibition, is at
issue. Feinstein does not, however, specify whether a non-Jewish substitute
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Rabbi Yehuda Rosanes (the Mishneh LaMelekh) and rule that the
client and the money are still considered to be "on two sides of
the river."'" As a result, any Jewish attorney who assists the client
violates lifnei iver.
What if a client could accomplish his objective without the
help of any Jew-so long as a non-Jew would help him? For
example, assume that a Nazir does not own any wine and can
only drink wine if somebody either gives or sells some to him.
Assume, further, that there are non-Jews who have wine and who
are willing to sell it to this Nazir. Some renowned Jewish law
authorities, including the Gaon of Vilna, 9 the Hazon Ish,2 ° (and
possibly Maimonides and Rabbi Aharon HaLevi (the Hinukh) as
well2 1 ) believe that, even in this case, a Jew who sells the Nazir
wine violates the biblical lifnei iver rule. Nonetheless, most
teacher would be available. If only Jewish substitutes were available, Feinstein,
by saying that only the mesayeah rule is implicated, follows the minority view.
18. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 10, at 333 ("Where it is impossible [for the
wrongdoer to obtain the object necessary for the sin] except from other Jews,
the majority of Jewish law authorities rule strictly."); R. CHAIM Y. D. AZULEI,
BIRKEi YOSEF, Hoshen Mishpat 9(3) (18th cent.) (Hebrew) (listing various
authorities that so rule and agreeing with them); R. YOSEF BABAD, MINHAT
HINUKH, Mitzvah 332(3) (19th cent.) (Hebrew); R. AvRA-Am DANzIG, HAKHMAT
ADAM, Kal 130, siman 2 (18th cent.) (Hebrew); R. YOSEF HAYYlM, BEN ISH HAI
(19th cent.) (Hebrew), cited in DR. AvRAHAm S. AvRAHAM, NISHMAT AvRAHAM
IV:86 (20th cent.) (Hebrew); R. EZRIEL HILDESHEIMER, RESPONSA RABBI EZRIEL I,
YorehDe'ah 182 (19th cent.) (Hebrew) (writing that this is the majority view); R.
YAAKOv KANIEVSKY, SEFER KEHILLOT YAAKOV 11:7, 11:106 (20th cent.) (Hebrew);
R. SHLOMO KLJGER, RESPONSA Tuv TA'AM VADA'AT, TELISA'AH 11:31 (19th cent.)
(Hebrew); R. HAYVIM MEDINI, SDEI HEMED, Ma'arakhat Vav, Kal 26, s.k. 9 (19th
cent.) (Hebrew) (stating that this is the majority view); R. YEHUDA RoSANES,
MISHNEH LAMELEKH, Hilkhot Malveh v'Loveh 4:2 (18th cent.) (Hebrew). See also
R. YITZHAK WEISS, MINHAT YITZHAK 111:79 (20th cent.) (Hebrew).
19. BIUR HAGRA, Yoreh De'ah 151, s.k. 8 (19th cent.) (Hebrew).
20. HAZON ISH, Yoreh De'ah, siman 52:13 (20th cent.) (Hebrew).
21. For various interpretations as to the positions of Maimonides and
Rabbi Aharon HaLevi (Hinukh) (13th cent.), see, for example, ADLER, supra
note 10, at 21; BABAD, supra note 18, at Mitzvah 68 (saying that, because Mai-
monides did not differentiate between cases involving "two sides of the river"
from those involving "one side of the river," Maimonides presumably held that
both cases involved biblical lifnei iver violations); R. IsAAc HERZOC, HEIK-IAL
YITZHAK, Orah Hayyim 42 (20th cent.) (Hebrew) (citing views that Maimonides
held that providing help in a "one side of the river" constituted a biblical viola-
tion); MEDINI, supra note 18, at Ma'arakhat Vav, Klal 26, s.k. 17; R. SHALOM
YITZHAK TAwIL, SHA'AREi SHALOM, sha'ar 3, hakdamah (20th cent.) (Hebrew)
(surveying the views of numerous commentators, but personally concluding
that Maimonides held that the prohibition in a "one side of the river case" was
rabbinic). R. AARON SAMUEL KOIDONOVER, EMUNAT SHMUEL 14 (17th cent.)
(Hebrew), and perhaps others, also ruled that the biblical lifnei iver rule applied
even where the violator could have transgressed without the assister's help. See
generally ADLER, supra note 10, at 23-26; TAWIL, supra, at sha'ar 3, halakha 1.
2000]
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authorities rule that where non-Jews would sell the Nazir wine,
the Nazir and the wine are considered to be "on one side of the
river" and aJew who sells the wine does not violate lifnei iver.22 As
discussed in Part IB, however, such conduct would in many
instances violate rabbinic, as opposed to biblical, law.
The client-attorney scenario, however, is not entirely analo-
gous to that of a Nazir and wine. If a Nazir drinks wine, he vio-
lates Jewish law irrespective of the quality of the wine he drinks.
Thus, so long as the Nazir could-and would-purchase wine
from non-Jews, it is clear that he could violate Halakha without
the help of any Jew.
23
By contrast, legal services are not fungible. One can never
be sure, even if many alternative attorneys are available, that the
client would succeed in obtaining the forbidden money through
the efforts of anyone other than the particular Jewish attorney in
question.24 Attorneys provide myriad services. They inform cli-
ents as to the likely consequences of particular tactics and advise
them as to which procedures to employ. They participate per-
sonally in the processes that are pursued, whether negotiative,
litigative or both. They recommend what offers to make or
accept, what interests to assert, and what arguments to advance.
They carefully craft written documents-whether contracts,
22. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 10, at 21.
23. Of course, if the same quality of wine as that sold by Jews was unavaila-
ble from non-Jews, or available only on less favorable terms, it is possible that a
Nazir would not purchase from non-Jews. If so, the situation could be consid-
ered as one involving "two sides of the river." See generally R. Tzvi HIRSCH SHA-
PiRA, DARKEI TESHUVA, Yoreh De'ah 151 (19th cent.) (Hebrew).
24. Rabbi Menashe Klein makes a similar argument regarding auditors,
and, partly for this reason, rules that it is forbidden for a Jew, as an auditor for
the government, to audit the tax returns of other Jews. See R. MENASHE KLEIN,
MISHNE HALACHOT VI:313 (20th cent.) (Hebrew); but see FEINSTEIN, supra note
10, at Hoshen Mishpat 92 (implicitly assuming that any qualitative differences
among auditors-at least among those who would be hired by the govern-
ment-are insignificant, by arguing that if a particularJewish auditor would not
work for the government, the government would use another auditor who
would find the citizen's wrongdoing). Interestingly, an Orthodox auditor told
me that there are standardized procedures that auditors apply and that, in fact,
one auditor should do as good a job as the next. I doubt that many attorneys
would so readily deny their uniqueness. As to the permissibility of serving as an
auditor, see generally R. YEHOSHUA BLAu, PITHEI HOSHEN, Hilkhot Nezikin, perek
4, n.44 (20th cent.) (Hebrew); R. MOSHE STERNBUCH, TESHUVOT vEHANHAGOT
1:807 (20th cent.) (Hebrew). As to whether a particular professional may have
unique talents, see CARO, supra note 9, at 336 (not all physicians will be equally
successful at treating a particular patient); R. MENASHE KLEIN, supra, at VII: 115
(one tailor may be better than another and, if so, if a Jewish tailor makes
immodest clothes for a particular customer, the tailor may be guilty of lifnei
iver).
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pleadings or briefs-and artfully engage in oral advocacy inside
and outside of court. With respect to litigation, attorneys design
strategies, select and prepare witnesses (experts and non-
experts), 25 . choose the order and manner in which to present
their cases, formulate questions to pose to an adversary's wit-
nesses, and respond, often under immediate time pressure, to
unexpected twists and turns. In addition, as will be discussed in
Part IB, they provide emotional support and encouragement to
their clients and have to be able to interrelate to them on a per-
sonal level. In providing such services, attorneys utilize their
intellectual power, their eloquence, their physical energy, and
whatever other personal resources they can bring to bear.
Some lawyers are more knowledgeable about a certain topic,
more diligent, creative, persuasive or just more fortunate 26 than
others.27 Consequently, if a particular Jewish lawyer were to
refuse a case, it may be unclear in certain cases whether a
replacement would be able to represent the client successfully.
Even if we assume there are some attorneys who might do just as
good of ajob as the particular lawyer in question, the client may
not be able to determine who these attorneys are. In many
instances, even lawyers are unable to accurately assess the effec-
tiveness of other attorneys with whom they have not had substan-
tial, direct professional interaction. Assuming both that some
other attorneys could do as good of a job and that the client
could recognize who these attorneys are, the client, for various
reasons, still might be unable to engage them without substantial
inconvenience. For example, in many cases, the representation
may be proscribed by some secular conflict of interest rule28 or
the attorneys may simply be unavailable. Even when assistance
involves the provision of a fungible good, some Jewish law
authorities (poskim) argue that if an alternative can only be
25. An attorney often has to gauge the psychological or emotional
strengths of potential witnesses, as well as the impact such witnesses will likely
have on the judge or jury.
26. Rashi explains that even the Talmudic view that says "there is no 'pre-
ordained fate' (maze) as to Jews," only means that Jews, through prayer, can
alter their fate. RASHI, TALMUD, supra note 12, at Sabbath 156b, s.v. ayn mazel.
27. Of course, the practical significance of such diversity may depend on
the complexity and the specialized nature of a client's case.
28. There are many statutes and judicially promulgated ethics rules that
disqualify attorneys from accepting particular clients. In many instances, an
entire firm may be vicariously disqualified based on an actual or apparent con-
flict with respect to a single member of the firm. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF
PROrESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.10 (1983).
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obtained through some inconvenience, the situation is deemed
to be one involving two sides of the river.29
In addition, assuming that the client was theoretically able to
engage an equally effective alternative attorney, that attorney
might be unwilling to provide services on terms as favorable as
those of the particular Jewish attorney in question. As to the sale
of goods, some authorities contend that if a non-Jewish seller
does not offer wine to a Nazir on the same attractive terms as a
Jewish seller, the Jewish seller would, by selling the wine, violate
lifnei iver.3 ° Unable to find an appropriate attorney3' willing to
take his case on acceptable terms, a client might even decide not
to file suit altogether.32 Thus, a particular lawyer's assistance may
well be necessary if the client is to be able to violate Jewish law by
collecting money to which he is not entitled. This is all the more
likely if the client's matter requires specialized knowledge or
training, limiting the number of appropriate alternative attor-
neys, or if the client must be personally represented in Israel,
restricting the number of available non-Jewish alternatives.33
Jewish law provides principles for dealing with uncertainty.
One such principle is that we rule strictly when faced with a possi-
ble violation of biblical law.34 If the lawyer's assistance is critical
to the client's success, then that lawyer, by enabling the client to
violate Jewish law, is guilty of the biblical offense of lifnei iver. If
there is doubt whether a client may be able to violate biblical law
without the lawyer's help, we have an uncertain case of a biblical
29. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 10, at 332; R. YAIR BACHARACH, HAWOT
YAMR 185 (17th cent.) (Hebrew); R. MORDECHA YAAKOV BREISH, HELKAT YAAKOV
II, Yoreh De'ah 23 (20th cent.) (Hebrew) (where stores are scarce and locating
an alternative would require effort, the renting of a store to ajew who will work
in the store on the Sabbath is a case involving two sides of the river); MENAHEM
HAMEIRI, BArr HABEKHiRAH, Avodah Zarah 6a (13th cent.) (Hebrew).
30. See BACHARACH, supra note 29; BREISH, supra note 29; SHAPiRA, supra
note 23. See also ADLER, supra note 10, at 332.
31. In some types of practices there is substantial personal interaction
between attorneys and clients and, for the relationship to succeed, each must
be comfortable with the other. As a practical matter, the number of alternative
attorneys available to a particular client will depend on the client's ability to
establish an effective relationship with an appropriate attorney.
32. See BACHARACH, supra note 29 (where a Jew sells merchandise at a
lower price than others or sells on credit while others do not, we do not say that
the purchaser can acquire the goods elsewhere).
33. Filing a suit typically requires a client to invest considerable time,
energy and money. Even in a contingent fee arrangement, a client may have to
expend sums to cover out-of-pocket expenses such as filing fees, depositions
and expert witnesses.
34. See supra note 17.
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lifnei iver violation, and the uncertainty rule would say that the
lawyer could not represent the client.
Assuming that a lawyer's representation of a client would
violate lifnei iver, are there any circumstances under which Jewish
law would nonetheless allow the lawyer to help the client? For all
practical purposes, the answer is "no," even if the refusal to rep-
resent clients wrongfully trying to collect money would cause an
attorney to suffer some financial loss.
5
The majority view is that Halakha requires that a person
comply with a biblical prohibition that proscribes action, 6 such
as lifnei iver, even if compliance causes him to lose all of his
wealth. 7
35. Theoretically, a decision not to represent a particular client might
lead to a loss of prospective revenue, whether from the client refused or
because of professional sanctions, including possible disbarment. The loss of
prospective revenue, as a practical matter, may in many instances be small.
Lawyers often have more work than they have time for. The threat of profes-
sional sanction seems to be negligible. In most instances, secular law does not
require a lawyer to accept a particular case. Even if a judge would otherwise
want to impose a particular pro bono case on an attorney, the judge may well be
sympathetic to switching assignments based on an attorney's religious convic-
tions. Indeed, an attorney may have a right to religious freedom-whether con-
stitutional or statutory-that would immunize him from any such sanction. But
see Tenn. Bd. of Prof]l Responsibility, Op. 96-F-140 (1996) (religious objection
to abortion held an insufficient basis for release from court appointment as
attorney for a party attacking statutory restrictions on abortions). A junior
attorney at a firm who refuses to represent a specific client may face the loss of
future income because of reprisals from more senior members of the firm. As
to all of these concerns, however, it is noteworthy that Halakha does not usually
treat the loss of prospective income as seriously as the loss of currently held
assets. See MEDINI, supra note 18, at Ma'arakhat Hey, Klal 59.
The most probable scenario involving a serious risk to current assets would
be- one in which an attorney or firm began representation of a client and only
later discovered that the client's objective violated Jewish law. Secular rules
regarding withdrawal from a matter already undertaken are considerably more
restrictive than the rules regarding the initial decision not to take a case. See,
e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROFSS1ONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16 (1983). If the client
must pay the replacement lawyer to redo legal work (reviewing witness state-
ments, deposition testimony, research, etc.), the withdrawing attorney may have
to refund all or part of any fees he received when he did that work initially.
Furthermore, an abrupt withdrawal, in certain circumstances, could cause the
client to lose, triggering a malpractice judgment-and a possible disciplinary
sanction-against the withdrawing attorney.
36. See AvRAHAM, supra note 18, at IV:86 (citing authorities).
37. See id.; R. MOSHE ISSERLES, SHULHAN ARuKH, Yoreh De'ah 157:1 (16th
cent.) (Hebrew) [hereinafter REMAl; MEDINI, supra note 18, at 107 (citing
views). In the improbable event that someone threatened to kill an attorney
unless the attorney helped him wrongfully collect money, there seems to be
some disagreement as to whether Halakha permits the attorney to take the case.
See TAWIL, supra note 21, at sha'ar 6, halakha 6 (citing various views). The issue
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B. The Proscriptions Against Assisting or Encouraging One to Sin
Suppose a person needs an object in order to violate Jewish
law, and that there are non-Jews who are ready, able and willing
to sell it to him. As mentioned in Part 1A, a number of prestigi-
ous authorities believe that ajew who sells him the object violates
the biblical lifnei iver rule." The majority view, however, is that
in such circumstances the person and the object are considered
to be "on one side of the river," and lifnei iver is inapplicable.
Nevertheless, most of these authorities rule that any Jew who pro-
vides the object to ajewish wrongdoer-whether by sale or gift-
breaches a rabbinic ban, referred to as mesayeah lidei ovrei aveirah,
against helping wrongdoers. 9 Thus, even if a wrongdoing Jewish
client could achieve his impermissible goal by using a non-Jewish
attorney, anyJewish attorney who represents the client would vio-
late the mesayeah rule.
Some commentators have suggested a number of limitations
to the rabbinic ban against assisting a wrongdoer. Evaluation of
the extent to which these suggestions reflect normative Jewish
law would require an intense analysis of Jewish law authorities
that would exceed the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, even if
a particular limitation might otherwise apply, the mere giving of
encouragement to a wrongdoing client, while he is in the process
of transgressing Jewish law, seems to be forbidden.
The Mishnah states that "one may assist non-Jews [who are
tilling the field] during the Sabbatical year, but one may not
assist Jews [who are tilling the field] during the Sabbatical
year."4 ° The Talmud explains that the Mishnah does not mean
becomes even more murky where a lesser degree of physical harm is
threatened.
38. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.
39. See, e.g., ADLER, supra note 10, at 332; R. AvRAHAm GOMBINER, SHUL-
HAN ARuKH, Orah Hayyim 347:1 (17th cent.) (Hebrew); R. HAWiM OZER
GRODZINSKy, AHIEZER 111:81(7) (20th cent.) (Hebrew); R. HArIM HAKOHEN,
LEV SHOMEA, Ma'arekhet 30, oht 39 (19th cent.) (Hebrew); R. SHABTAI MEIR
HAKOHEN, SHULHAN ARUKH, Yoreh De'ah 151:1, s.k. 7 (17th cent.) (Hebrew)
[hereinafter SHAKH]; R.YISROEL MEIR HAKOHEN, MISHNAH BRURAH 347:9 [here-
inafter MEIR HAKOHEN, MISHNAH BRURAH] (20th cent.) (Hebrew); R. DAVID
HALEvi, SHULHAN ARuKH, Orah Hayyim 347 [hereinafter TAZ] (17th cent.)
(Hebrew); R. YOSEF ISSER, SHA'AR MISHPAT, Hoshen Mishpat 26:1; KLUGER, supra
note 18; R. SHMUEL KOLIN, MAHATZIT HASHEKEL, Orah Hayyim 347:1 (19th cent.)
(Hebrew); R. YITZHAK YEHUDA SHMELKES, ORAH HAYIM 25 (19th cent.)
(Hebrew); R. SHALOM M. SHVADRON, MAHARsRAM 11:93 (19th cent.) (Hebrew);
R. ABDALLAH SOMEAH, ZIVHEI TZEDEK, Hoshen Mishpat 2 (19th cent.) (Hebrew)
(citing authorities); R. SHLOMO YEHUDA BEN PESAH TzVI, EREKH SHAI, Hoshen
Mishpat 26 (19th cent.) (Hebrew); WEISS, supra note 18; R. OvADIA YOSEF, YABIA
OMER II, Orah Hayyim 15, YEHAVE DA'AT 111:67.
40. MISHNAH, Gittin, perek 5, mishnah 9.
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that one may actually work the field with a non-Jew during the
Sabbatical year, but, instead, merely that one may say words of
encouragement such as "May your hands be strengthened."'"
Maimonides writes:
One may only assist [non-Jews] . . . on the Sabbatical Year
with words alone. If you see him [i.e., a non-Jew] plow or
seed, you may say to him "May you be strengthened" or
"Succeed" or some similar expression, because they [non-
Jews] are not commanded [not to till the land on the Sab-
batical Year].. 42
The clear implication is that if Jewish law forbade non-Jews
from performing such work, it would be prohibited to give them
such verbal encouragement.43  Rabbi Avraham Gombiner
(Magen Avraham) makes this inference and writes that "It is good
manners [derekh eretz] to say to someone who is working, 'May
your job succeed.' But if someone is doing forbidden work, it is
prohibited to say such a thing to him."44 The Mishnah Brurah
similarly cites this as a statement of normative Jewish law.45 From
the Talmudic source and from the unqualified statements of the
poskim, this prohibition appears to apply even if the wrongdoer
would have blithely continued with his violation without any
encouragement.
From these and other sources,4 6 Rabbi Yitzhak Weiss4 7 and
Rabbi Moshe Schick48 similarly conclude that even if a person is
not obligated to try to prevent someone from violating Jewish
law, one is forbidden to give him verbal encouragement, at least
while he is engaged in the proscribed conduct.49 Indeed, Rabbi
Weiss argues that at least some commentators may believe that in
41. RASHi, TALMUD, supra note 12, at Gittin 62a.
42. MAIMONIDES, MISHNEH TORAH, Hilkhot Shmittah VeYovel, perek 8,
halakha 8.
43. See ADLER, supra note 10, at 148.
44. GOMBINER, supra note 39, at Orah Hayyim 347, s.k. 4.
45. MEIR HAKOHEN, MISHNAH BRURAH, supra note 39, at 347, s.k. 7.
46. See, e.g., RASHI, TALMUD, supra note 12, at Sanhedrin 74-75.
47. WEISS, supra note 18, at IV:79.
48. R. MOSHE SCHICK, MAHARAM SCHICK, Orah Hayyim 303 (19th cent.)
(Hebrew).
49. It is unclear whether providing such encouragement is a lifnei iver or
mesayeah violation or whether it constitutes a distinct transgression of "strength-
ening the hands of evildoers." In his commentary to the Talmud, Rashi states
that in providing verbal encouragement, it is "as if" one assisted the wrongdoer.
See RASHI, TALMUD, supra note 12. See generally ADLER, supra note 10, at 148-50;
WEISS, supra note 18, at LV:79 (arguing that some authorities might consider
such encouragement to violate lifnei iver). None of these authorities specifically
discusses the attorney-client relationship, and none explore whether providing
encouragement would be permitted if the wrongdoer paid for it.
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a "one side of the river" scenario, giving verbal encouragement is
worse than selling the wrongdoer the object with which he com-
mits the offense. By verbally encouraging the wrongdoer, a per-
son conveys the clear message that he agrees with the violation of
Jewish law. When someone merely sells an object, this message is
not as clear. The purchaser's purpose may be unknown or
uncertain or may change before the object is used. In addition,
the seller could expressly articulate his personal opposition to
any proscribed use.
If an attorney represents a client who sues in secular court to
collect money to which he is not entitled under Jewish law, the
client may be deemed to be in the process of his transgression
from the beginning of the trial to its end, or to the collection of
the money. There would be a great risk that the lawyer would
wrongfully provide verbal encouragement to his client during
this time.
C. The Affirmative Duty to Prevent a Jew from Violating Jewish Law
In addition, Jewish law assumes both that Jews are legally
responsible for each other50 and that they are spiritually interre-
lated. Thus, improper conduct by any individual Jew not only
weighs against the community as a whole, but may also adversely
affect the spiritual refinement of each member of the commu-
nity.51 Partly as a result of this interdependence, the Torah tells
each Jew who sees another committing a biblical violation that
"You must admonish a member of your nation."52 Indeed, if a
50. See, e.g., HEHASID, supra note 50, at 93, 233, 601.
51. See, e.g., ARYEH KAPLAN, HANDBOOK OF JEWISH THOUGHT II 136-37
(1990):
When a single Jew sins, it is not he alone who suffers, but the entire
Jewish people. In the Midrash, this is likened to passengers on a single
huge ship. Though all the passengers may be very careful not to dam-
age the hull, if one of them takes a drill and begins drilling holes
under his own seat, the ship will sink, and all will drown. In the same
manner, whenever any Jew does not keep the Torah, all others are
affected spiritually. Such actions may even precipitate physical suffer-
ing for the Jewish people.
52. Lev. 19:17. See also CARO, supra note 9, at Orah Hayyim 608. Some
commentators explain that this obligation comprises two elements. The first is
a duty to gently admonish someone who has violated, or seems about to violate,
Jewish law. According to many authorities, this duty applies even if the person
admonished will not alter his conduct. The second, based on the interrelation-
ship established by the biblical oaths the nation took on Mounts Eval and Ger-
izin, requires more vigorous action to prevent another from breaching Jewish
law. See SHICK, supra note 48; WEISS, supra note 9, at 111:79. But see R. ELIEZER
WALDENBURG, TzITz ELIEZER XVII, Kuntras Refuah BeShabbat, perek 11 (20th
cent.) (Hebrew). See generally R. YEHUDA HEHASID, SEFER HASIDIM 93 (20th
THE ATTORNEY-CIJENT RELATIONSHIP
Jew, A, has the ability to prevent another Jew, B, from violating
Jewish law and does not do so, A incurs guilt for the offense that
B commits.
53
If the biblical rule being violated is not explicitly stated in
the Torah, if B is not purposely violating the law, and if A is sure
that B will not accept the rebuke, A should not admonish B. In
such a case, it is better that B violate Jewish law unknowingly
rather than knowingly. 54 On the other hand, if the rule is explic-
itly stated or B is purposely violating a particular Jewish law provi-
sion, A is obligated to rebuke him even if A is certain the rebuke
will be ineffective.55
There are exceptions to this obligation. For example, A
need not rebuke B if A fears that by doing so he will place him-
self in danger because B will retaliate against him.56 In addition,
several authorities rule that A is not required to rebuke B if B has
completely rejected Jewish law. The Hebrew word for "your
nation" (amkhah) is spelled with the same Hebrew letters as the
word for "with you" (imkhah). Consequently, some say that the
duty to rebuke only applies as to those Jews who are "with you" in
the sense that they generally accept the validity of Jewish law.57
cent.) (Hebrew) ("All Jews are responsible for each other. If it were not for this
responsibility a person would not admonish his fellow about his fellow's sins
and he would not pay attention to find out who is a transgressor and [take steps
to stop him] .... ).
53. RASHI, TALMUD, supra note 12, at Sanhedrin 27a ("A person dies
because of the iniquity of his brother-to teach you that everyone is responsible
for each other. That is where it was possible for them to [effectively] admonish
the wrongdoers and they did not do so."). See also REMA, supra note 37.
54. An unknowing violation is a less serious breach of Jewish law. See
CARO, supra note 9, at Orah Hayyim 608. This sort of situation might arise, for
example, when B is so certain that what he is doing is permitted that he will not
pay any heed to A (especially if B believes that A is much less learned than he
about Jewish law).
55. In this situation, B is already violating Jewish law knowingly. Conse-
quently, the argument that "it is better for a person to violate unknowingly
rather than knowingly" does not apply.
56. See, e.g., MEIR HAKOHEN, MISHNAH BRURAH, supra note 39, at Orah
Hayyim 608:7. See also REmA, supra note 37, at 334, Hoshen Mishpat 12. One
might expect that a person would be required to spend up to 20% of his wealth
to fulfill the affirmative biblical obligation to admonish another. See YAAKoV
WEIss, Minhat Yitzhak V:8 (Hebrew); supra notes 41-50 and accompanying text.
Nevertheless, Moshe Isserles, see REtA, supra note 37, who cites Rabbi Asher
Weil, seems to rule that a person need not spend any money to fulfill the duty
to admonish. See R. ASHER WEIL, SHUT MAHARIV 157 (15th cent) (Hebrew). See
generally R. Zvi HIRSCH EISENSTADT, PISHEi TESHUVAH, Yoreh De'ah 157, sif koton 5,
sifkoton 19 (citing various views, including one that suggests a possible obliga-
tion to spend all of one's money to fulfill this duty) (19th cent.) (Hebrew).
57. See, e.g., YISROEL MEIR HAKOHEN, BlUR HALAKHA, ORAH HAYIM 608,
s.v. Aval (20th cent.) (Hebrew) (citing various authorities); R. YEHIEL M.
2000]
364 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 14
In light of the large number of contemporary Jews who, unfortu-
nately, do not observe Jewish law, one might think that this latter
exception essentially "swallows the rule." Yet there is a very
important exception to the exception, because many of today's
nonreligious Jews were raised in a nonreligious environment-or
even in an environment actively opposed to Orthodox Judaism.
According to some authorities:
[A] person who has been brought up in a nonreligious
environment where he never had the opportunity to learn
aboutJudaism, is like a child who was abducted by gentiles,
and is not considered to be doing wrong purposely. Even
if he is later exposed to authentic Judaism, he is not to be
blamed for rejecting it, since it is almost impossible to over-
come one's childhood upbringing. Therefore, such a per-
son is not to be counted among the nonbelievers, and he
should be approached with love and with every attempt to
bring him back to the teachings of our faith.58
Consequently, if a Jewish attorney has a Jewish client, not
only may it be forbidden for the attorney to enable, facilitate or
encourage the client's wrongful conduct, but he may have to
affirmatively attempt to dissuade the client. Thus, Jewish law's
view of the attorney-client relationship does not mirror either the
godfather or hired gun models.
EPSTEIN, ARUKH HASHULHAN, Orah Hayyim 608:7 (19th cent.) (Hebrew). If, how-
ever, you may convince such a person to do the right thing, some say that you
must try to do so. See, e.g., R. YOSEF BEN MOSHE BABAD, MINHAT HINUKH 239
(Hebrew).
58. KAPLAN, supra note 51, at 151 (citing authorities, some of which do
not seem to support the precise statements made in his text). A number of
poskim indicate that many contemporary Jews, especially those raised by non-
observant parents, should be considered to be such "child-abductees." See, e.g.,
R. YISROEL REISMAN, THE LAws OF RIBIs 98, n.17 (1990) (citing Rabbi Shimon
Grinfeld and Rabbi Avraham Isaiah Karelitz for the rule that non-observant
Jews who were not raised in an orthodox home must be treated just as obser-
vantJews regarding prohibitions concerning interest-bearing loans). See also R.
YAAKov ETrLINGER, BINYON TZIYON HEHADASHOT 23 (19th cent.) (Hebrew); R.
DAVID Zvi HoFFMANN, MELAMED LEHOVEL, Orah Hayyim 5, 29 (19th cent.)
(Hebrew); R. AvRAHAM ISAIAH KAREUTZ, HAZON ISH, Yoreh De'ah, Hilkhot Sheitah
2:16 (19th cent.) (Hebrew); R. CHAIM KOENIG, SHUT HuKEi HAYIM NiSHMAT
SARAH, Hoshen Mishpat IV:20 (20th cent.) (Hebrew) (citing authorities); R.
YEHIEL YAAxOV WEINBERG, SERIDEI EISH 11:10 20 (20th cent.) (Hebrew); R.
MOSHE STERNBUCH, TESHUVOT vEHANHAGOT, Orah Hayyim 1:132, 319, 363 20
(20th cent.) (Hebrew).
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D. The Duty to Prevent Someone-Even the Other Party to a
Lawsuit-From Being Harmed
Jewish law requires a Jew to save another who is in danger.
59
Perhaps the clearest textual basis for this rule is the verse that
states: "Do not stand idly by your fellow's blood."6 Nonetheless,
other authorities assert that the duty to rescue arises from the
verse, "If your fellow is missing something, you shall restore it to
him."6 1
This duty applies even when the threat is financial.6 2 If a
client seeks to collect money to which he is not entitled under
Jewish law, the client's attorney is obligated to try to save the
adversary from this financial loss. Although Jewish law does not
require an attorney to risk a large personal financial loss to save
someone else from a loss, it would demand that the attorney
attempt to convince his client to refrain from such wrongful
conduct.
II. THE FRIEND AND GURU APPROACHES
Both the lawyer as friend and lawyer as guru models require
attorneys to consider the interests of others, not merely the inter-
ests of their clients. Shaffer and Cochran eloquently argue that
the lawyer as friend model is to be preferred.6"
According to Shaffer and Cochran, the lawyer as friend
manifests this friendship by engaging the client in moral dis-
course designed to promote the client's ability "to determine the
good."6 4 They repeatedly emphasize that the greatest moral
growth comes from voluntarily doing that which is good.6" Nev-
ertheless, if, despite an attorney's earnest efforts at moral dis-
course, an impasse is reached, Shaffer and Cochran believe that
the proper course for the attorney is to resign.6 6 They firmly
59. See generally Aaron Kirschenbaum, The Bystander's Duty to Rescue in Jew-
ish Law, inJEWISH LAW AND LEGAL THEORY (Martin P. Golding ed., 1993).
60. Lev. 19:16.
61. Deut. 22:2; see also RASHI, TALMUD, supra note 12, at Sanhedrin 73.
62. See, e.g., R. J. DAVID BLEICH, CONTEMPORARY HALAKHIc PROBLEMS II 77
(1994); R. YISROEL MEIR HAKOHEN, HAFETZ HAYvIM, Be'er Mayim Hayyim, Hilkhot
Issurei Rekhilut 9:1 20 (20th cent.) (Hebrew).
63. See BLEICH, supra note 62, at 44.
64. See Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-At-Law:
Lessons From Dostoyevsky, 35 Hous. L. REV. 327, 378 (1998). I cite this article on
several occasions as representing the Shaffer-Cochran position, because I
believe that as to these issues Prof. Cochran's views are shared by Prof. Shaffer
as well.
65. See id. at 380.
66. See id. at 352.
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assert that the lawyer should not use any "unequal power" or
influence to impose his will on the client.67
There are, of course, various practical problems with the
Shaffer-Cochran approach. Resigning, for instance, is not always
legally permitted. An attorney of record, for instance, often
needs court approval,68 which may not be granted.69 In addition,
Shaffer and Cochran acknowledge that there are power imbal-
ances in attorney-client relationships, and that the attorney must
continuously regulate the "intensity" of her discourse in order to
encourage her client without overcoming her client's own will. 70
It may be unreasonable to expect that attorneys will walk this
tightrope without falling. Often they may err by providing insuf-
ficient guidance and a client may commit a wrong that could
have been avoided.
Moreover, Jewish law disagrees on substantive grounds as
well. According to Jewish thought, a person's character is influ-
enced by his actions (nifal lifie pe'ulotov).71 Doing the right thing
is deemed to be per se good, even if it is not done for the right
reason. Certain secular thinkers acknowledge that by doing
67. See id. at 379:
Lawyers cannot become a friend to every client, but they might discuss
moral issues with a client in the way that they would discuss moral
issues with a friend, not imposing their values on the client, but not
being afraid to influence the client.... The lawyer as friend engages
in moral conversation with the client but leaves decisions (including a
decision such as whether to confess) to the client. Such a lawyer seeks
not to impose.
68. See, e.g., MODEL RuLES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b)
(1983).
69. See, e.g., Tenn. Bd. of Prof'I Responsibility, Op. 96-F-140 (1996). In
addition, Shaffer and Cochran do not discuss the possible practical ramifica-
tions of withdrawal. For example, withdrawal may only be permitted if there
will be no harm to the client's interests. But a client who engages new counsel
may have to spend a considerable amount of money in hourly bills while the
new attorney becomes familiar with the file, bills that would have been unneces-
sary had the original counsel stayed on. It is not entirely clear whether they
think counsel should resign, even if this means counsel has to disgorge fees that
were previously earned.
70. See, e.g., Cochran, supra note 64, at 392:
A lawyer should measure her words during conversation with a client.
If a lawyer is too intense, she may overcome the client and there will
be no mutual discourse. However, there is also the danger that if the
lawyer is not sufficiently intense, the client may not take the moral
issue seriously. Therefore, a lawyer should regulate the intensity with
which she engages the client in moral discourse.
71. See R. AHARON HALEVl, SEFER HAHINUKH, Commandments 16 (13th
cent.) (Hebrew). See generally Steven H. Resnicoff, A Jewish Look at Lawyering
Ethics-A Preliminary Essay, 15 ToURo L. REv. 73, 102-03 (1998).
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good on one occasion, a person finds it easier to do so again.7 2
Jewish belief goes further, contending that even doing good for
the wrong reason brings a person to do good for the right rea-
son.7" In contrast, by committing wrongful deeds, a person
becomes desensitized to their wrongfulness and is increasingly
likely to repeat them."
Interestingly, the social psychology theory of cognitive disso-
nance suggests an arguably similar phenomenon when it
describes the "induced-compliance paradigm":
In this paradigm, a person is persuaded to behave in a
way (acting "not-X") that is contrary to her attitudes ("I
believe X"). Since the action-cognition ("I acted not-X")
cannot be changed, the individual will reduce the disso-
nance by changing the original attitude to "I believe not-
X",75
According to this theory, if a person who does not believe in
the rightfulness of certain good acts is convinced to do the acts,
the consequential cognitive dissonance may cause him to change
his attitudes and regard the deeds as rightful.
76
72. See WILIaM SHAKESPcARE, HAMLET act 3, sc.4, lines 176-87:
Good night; but go not to my uncle's bed;
Assume a virtue, if you have it not.
That monster, custom, who all sense doth eat
Of habits evil, is angel yet in this,
That aptly is put on. Refrain tonight,
And that shall lend a kind of easiness
To the next abstinence: the next more easy;
For use almost can change the stamp of nature
And either [tame] the devil or throw him out.
73. See, e.g., RASHI, TALMUD, supra note 12, at Nazir 23b.
74. See id., at Yuma 86b, 87a; Moed Koton 27b; Kiddushin 40a; Erekhin 30b;
YALKUT SHIMONI, PARSHAS BEHAR, REMEZ 661 (cent. unknown) (Hebrew).
Under special circumstances, Jewish law requires or encourages acts that would
ordinarily be considered morally problematic. Thus, in order to promote
peace, Jewish law sometimes permits "white lies." Even so, however, Jewish
authorities emphasize that such practices are only allowed occasionally. Other-
wise, they could become habitual. See, e.g., YAAKov FISH, TITEIN EMES LEYAAKOV
49 (3d ed. 1986) (citing various poskim) (Hebrew); cf. R. HAYIM BEN MOSHE
ATTAR, OHR HAHAVYIM, Mikrot Gedolot, Deuteronomy 13:18 (18th cent.) (Hebrew).
75. Davida H. Isaacs, "It's Nothing Personal"--But Should it Be?: Finding
Agent Liability for Violations of the Federal Employment Discrimination Statutes, 22
N.Y.U. REv. L. & Soc. CHANGE 505, 528 (1996). See generally LEON FESTINGER, A
THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); ROBERT A. WICKLUND & JACK W.
BREHM, PERSPECTIVES ON COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1976).
76. Secularists who agree that this process takes place may complain that
such attitudinal changes are "artificially" induced. Jewish law commentators,
however, would more likely be pleased as the person's perspectives became har-
monized with Halakha.
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Because Jewish law recognizes the great value of proper
deeds-even when they are not entirely the product of a person's
totally unfettered autonomy, it rejects the Shaffer-Cochran
choice of attorney withdrawal as the means to resolve an
impasse.77 Instead, it would urge the Jewish attorney to use all of
his persuasive powers to convince the client to do what is right
because this, according to Jewish belief, is truly in the client's
best interest. Indeed, when ancient Israel was governed by reli-
gious leaders whose authority was directly attributable to Moses,
those leaders would, in appropriate circumstances, use various
coercive methods to accomplish compliance with Jewish law.78
Jewish law rejects the withdrawal option for other reasons as
well. Under the Shaffer-Cochran approach, although the attor-
ney may arguably be the client's friend, he is not apparently a
friend to anyone else. If a crooked client is bent on harming
others, the Shaffer-Cochran reliance on withdrawal exposes the
client's helpless victims to his will. By contrast, Jewish law would
not allow an attorney to sacrifice such innocent victims. Instead,
by struggling to convince the client to do the right thing-even if
this choice is "imposed" on him by virtue of the lawyer's lever-
age-the lawyer would help both the client and those he would
otherwise harm.
Recall, also, that under Jewish law, the client-and the
entire Jewish community-bears collective responsibility for each
individual's conduct. By persuading the client to act properly,
the client and the nation face a more favorable Divine judgment.
In emphasizing results-for the client, for non-clients and
for the community-rather than merely the objective of moral
discourse, Jewish law's view of the attorney-client relationship
resembles that which Shaffer and Cochran call the guru model.
Perhaps the most important difference is that the attorney does
not purport to be the ultimate judge of what is right and wrong,
but defers to Jewish law. In the many instances where Jewish law
permits client discretion, Jewish law would not prescribe any par-
77. Shaffer and Cochran seem to believe that proper conduct, even when
coerced, results in some "influenced moral growth," but just that when such
conduct is voluntary "deeper moral growth" is achieved. See, e.g., Cochran,
supra note 64, at 380. From their own perspective, then, one may ask whether
the Shaffer-Cochran model is yet another instance in which the "best" is the
enemy of the better. While arguably promoting some fully voluntary moral
growth (the "best"), the Shaffer-Cochran model abandons the possibility of per-
haps much more substantial "influenced" growth (the "better").
78. Whether, and under what conditions, the resort to physically coercive
measures may be appropriate in modern times is a subject of substantial debate.
See, e.g., Steven H. Resnicoff, Physician-Assisted Dying: Halachic Perspectives, J.
HALAc-A & CONTEMP. Soc'v 47, 82-83 (1999).
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ticular course of action by the attorney, despite his or her per-
sonal moral sensitivities.
Furthermore, Jewish law itself affords the client an active
role in ascertaining whether an action is permitted, irrespective
of the attorney's opinion. The answer to many halakhic questions
are unclear or subject to debate even among those who are
highly trained in Jewish law. This is in part explained by Jewish
law's conceptual depth and its sensitivity to factual nuances. Jew-
ish law encourages individuals to establish personal relationships
with Jewish law experts, who, by virtue of the understanding they
develop regarding such individuals, become increasingly quali-
fied to provide them Jewish law guidance. Where a client has
sought advice from an established Jewish law authority, the attor-
ney is not obligated in any way to dissuade the client from imple-
menting such advice, even if the attorney's own advisor, if he had
been asked, would rule otherwise. Similarly, there are instances
in which internal Jewish law principles permit a litigant to adopt
any of the alternative positions articulated by certain classical
Jewish law authorities.79
Of course, to the extent that the Jewish law approach would
encourage an attorney to "impose" his views on his client, Jewish
law would impinge on the current cultural inclination favoring
client autonomy. Perhaps any objection to this approach could
be minimized if the attorney disclosed his vision of the attorney-
client relationship at the outset. Yet it seems that many attorneys
are influenced by ideological or other non-religious values,
which they fail to disclose. Although the subject is beyond the
scope of this paper, it is possible that all attorneys should,
through introspection, ascertain their ideals and share them
openly with prospective clients. Such conversations might be a
good beginning toward more meaningful-and more honest-
relationships.
CONCLUSION
Neither the purported institutional interests of an adver-
sarial system of justice nor the interests of a particular client jus-
tify, under Jewish law, the amorality of the godfather or hired
gun paradigms. His status as an attorney provides no excuse for
engaging in religiously prohibited tactics. Moreover, where a cli-
ent's objective violates Jewish law, the attorney, as a general rule,
may not enable, facilitate or encourage that goal. Where the
attorney can persuade the client to autonomously adopt the cor-
79. See, e.g., R. HAYYIM BENVENISTE, KENNESET HAGEDOLAH, PRINCIPLES OF
KIM Li 25 (17th cent.) (Hebrew).
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rect course of conduct, Jewish law resembles the lawyer as friend
model. However, the importance of accomplishing good results
for the client, for the community, and for affected third parties
demands that the attorney use all of his persuasive repertoire to
convince the client to act correctly. Unlike an attorney-friend,
who fears infringement of the client's moral autonomy, the Jew-
ish lawyer cannot simply walk away from a client-thereby aban-
doning the client, the community and third parties-when he
might otherwise use his superior rhetorical skills, intelligence or
experience to successfully sway the client to the right path. Nev-
ertheless, the Jewish model, unlike the lawyer as guru approach,
affords the client an important role in the determination of what
it is that Jewish law in fact demands.
